Alisha Mazlumyar, el líder tribal de Marjah, es, por decir algo, un hombre de enormes contradicciones.

“Soy un poco escritor, un poco poeta, un poco político”, afirma. Pero Mazlumyar también es el director del Departamento de Información y Cultura de Helmand. “Y tengo una Kalashnikov bajo mi escritorio”.
Alto, con turbante, Mazlumyar tiene una amplia sonrisa blanca que le ilumina su barbudo rostro. Es un personaje importante y muy polémico, lo que explica el arma bajo la mesa.

Mazlumyar también es un símbolo de las complejidades y contradicciones que amenazan con interferir en los intentos del gobierno afgano y de la comunidad internacional para estabilizar Marjah, y el resto de la provincia de Helmand. Mazlumyar es un khan, un terrateniente, apoyado por la poderosa tribu Achekzai.

“No soy un hombre común y corriente”, confiesa con modestia.

Durante bastante tiempo, los khans han mantenido un peligroso doble estándar con el gobierno y los talibanes.

Las tierras de la provincia de Helmand son sinónimo de cultivo de amapola y la riqueza que ésta genera. Helmand es el mayor productor de amapola opiácea del mundo y aporta más de la mitad de la materia prima de la heroína.

El narcotráfico y la inestabilidad política aquí van de la mano. Los talibanes protegen los campos de amapolas y acompañan a los traficantes hasta la frontera para asegurarse que la policía no aparece por los mercadillos de opio durante la primavera. Cuando el gobierno afgano establece el control sobre un área determinada, el siguiente paso –inevitable- es la destrucción de los cultivos y la detención de los capos de la droga.

En ningún lugar esto es más evidente que en Marjah, el principal mercado del opio y centro de procesamiento de la heroína de Helmand. Gulab Mangal, gobernador de la provincia, está decidido a acabar con las drogas y la corrupción; y los terratenientes de la zona tienen mucho que perder si se sale con la suya.

Ahora, los poderosos de Marjah se han visto “atrapados” entre su supuesta lealtad al gobierno afgano y su matrimonio de conveniencia con los talibanes.

“Existe un vínculo [entre los traficantes y los talibanes]”, afirma Mangal. “Es normal. Es un negocio y tienen intereses comunes. En las áreas controladas por el gobierno no hay cultivo de amapola”. 
Mazlumyar niega tajantemente que tenga intereses relacionados con la droga, pero en una shura (consejo) reciente, durante la visita del presidente Hamid Karzai, la población local lo acusó de corrupto y cruel.

“No queremos gente como este tal Mazlumyar,” afirma uno de los líderes de la tribu. “Se quedó con todo el dinero de la amapola”.

No es de sorprender que Mazlumyar rechace la acusación.

“No eran líderes de la tribu. Eran un grupo de zapateros y terroristas”.  

Más allá de los cultivos de amapola –ahora en peligro-, Marjah es un territorio bastante insignificante cerca de Lashkar Gah, la capital provincial. Sin embargo, la operación Moshtarak, la mayor ofensiva militar realizada hace unas semanas, la ha vuelto a poner en el centro de la noticia.

“Los ojos del mundo miran hacia Marjah”, afirma Mangal, con satisfacción.

La operación Moshtarak aportará miles de millones de dólares en ayuda a la zona. Es por esta razón que los khans locales protagonizaron una cruenta batalla para posicionarse de la mejor forma posible.

Pero la designación finalmente recayó en un candidato inesperado: Haji Zahir, oriundo de Helmand que pasó más de 15 años en Alemania, cinco de ellos en la cárcel por agresión, según la prensa.

Zahir fue condenado por apuñalar a su hijastro, pero esto no hizo mella entre quienes le votaron. 

“Es un buen hombre. Esos son asuntos familiares y no deberían perjudicar su situación”, señala Mohammad Iliyas Dayee, un destacado periodista de Helmand.

Muchos sostienen que una de las razones del triunfo de Zahir es el enorme desprecio de los habitantes de Marjah hacia los ex líderes de la zona, hombres como Mazlumyar.

“[Cuando Mazlumyar estaba en el poder], los niños no podían salir de su casa por temor a que los secuestraran”, afirma una vecina. “Nos quitaba las tierras con amenazas. Es un hombre malo”.
“Tonterías”, responde Mazlumyar. “Muéstrenme a una familia a la que le hayan secuestrado un hijo”.

Nadie aceptó el reto. 

Pese a la escasa popularidad en su zona, Mazlumyar no deja de gozar de cierta importancia. Fue designado director del Departamento de Información y Cultura de Helmand por el propio presidente y mantiene estrechos vínculos con el gobierno central.

“Karzai me dijo después de la shura que no le había creído a esa gente”, afirma. “Me dijo que sabía que era una trama en mi contra”.

Mazlumyar tiene buenas relaciones con otros líderes tribales, que tienen escaso aprecio por el gobierno de Mangal y sus ideas reformistas: saben que pueden perder poder, posición y dinero si el gobernador consigue aplicar sus medidas populistas contra el cultivo de amapola y la corrupción.

Mangal también sabe que tendrá que hacer frente al gobierno central. Durante una acalorada reunión con los líderes de Marjah, el presidente Hamid Karzai les habría dicho que protegería los cultivos de amapola de este año. Como falta muy poco para comenzar la cosecha, Karzai habría dicho que ya habían sufrido bastante. Dawood Ahmadi, portavoz de Mangal, confirma que el mandatario efectivamente realizó esta declaración.  

“Pero sólo fueron promesas de palabra, no hay nada escrito”, añade Mangal. “Comenzaremos la destrucción de la amapola en las próximas semanas”.

El anuncio sólo pondrá más gente en su contra ya que la amapola es el sector productivo más importante de la región. Y Mangal necesita muchos amigos si desea mantener el control de Marjah.
A pesar de que la bandera afgana ondea en el edificio de la autoridad local de Marjah, el distrito puede provocar serios problemas a las fuerzas afganas e internacionales que patrullan actualmente las calles.

“Los talibanes vuelven a construir sus guaridas. Esperan en sus casas, con armas y explosivos. Salen por la noche para atacar a las fuerzas extranjeras e instalar minas, luego se quedan tranquilos durante el día”, señala Dayee.

Haji Zahir, el gobernador del distrito, comparte la misma preocupación.

“Si las fuerzas afganas e internacionales no comienzan a actuar pronto, existe la posibilidad de que se pierda el control de la situación”, afirma.

En Marjah, los residentes ya comienzan a sentir la tensión.

“No he tenido tanto miedo en 20 años como ahora”, dice Haji Toza Gul Rahimzai, uno de los líderes del lugar. “No sabes quién es el enemigo ni quién es tu amigo. Los norteamericanos son lentos y esto fortalece a los talibanes. Salen de sus casas, se reúnen y hacen planes”.

Las fuerzas extranjeras han suspendido los registros casa por casa, en gran parte debido al general Stanley McChrystal, que quiere ganarse a los afganos a través de una estrategia para llegar a la mente y el corazón de la población. En Marjah, sin embargo, le podría salir el tiro por la culata porque su táctica otorga más tiempo y recursos a los insurgentes. 

“Aún no han despejado Marjah”, afirma Dost Mohammad, un vecino de la zona que lleva un turbante negro y mira sigilosamente a su alrededor mientras habla. “No se ven los talibanes, no son visibles.

Pero mantienen la estructura y la comunicación con sus líderes. Cambian de táctica cada día. Por la noche salen y colocan minas y al día siguiente, los extranjeros detienen a la población civil…”.
Aún hay un pequeño margen para convencer a los residentes –más bien escépticos- de que las tropas extranjeras se quedarán el tiempo suficiente para estabilizar la zona, de que la policía afgana podrá contener a los talibanes y de que tendrán protección y seguridad si deciden apoyar al gobierno.

Pero los residentes de Marjah pierden cada día la esperanza. La visita de Karzai el 7 de marzo pasado congregó a un buen número de líderes de la tribu. Sin embargo, tras la marcha del presidente, dos de los asistentes aparecieron decapitados.

“Nadie quiere hacer frente a los cuchillos afilados de los talibanes”, afirma un líder local.

El miedo de la gente se palpa en su rostro.

“Los talibanes circulan durante el día sin armas”, señala Janat Gul Aka, vecino del barrio de Hashtiyan, en Marjah. “Pero nos advierten con los ojos. Nos miran como si nos dijeran ‘espera, que ya llega la noche’”. 

Kandahar, Afghanistan
23 March 2010

The mission required crossing a bridge that had been blown up a couple hours earlier by a suicide car bomber.  The attacker hit a convoy from the 82nd Airborne, killing American soldier Ian Gelig.  Now with a hole in the bridge and recovery operations underway, our mission was cancelled.  So I called the Air Force to see if they were busy.  Yes, it turns out, the Air Force is busy every day, but Captain Kristen Duncan took me down to the ramp where the A-10 “Warthogs” are parked.

Two pilots were gearing up to fly from Kandahar over to neighboring Helmand to support a British unit.  The A-10 “Warthogs” are slow—not supersonic—but fantastically agile.  The aircraft dart like dragonflies and seem to change direction against the laws of physics.  The A-10s can turn so fast that they can break the laws of healthy physiology, and can cause a pilot to pass out and crash his airplane.  And so pilots wear G-suits to help counter adverse fluid dynamics.

The helmets offer no ballistic protection.  Helmets that ground troops wear can stop bullets, and have done so in Iraq and Afghanistan on many occasions, usually knocking out the wearer.  I remember a Marine Major in Mosul who got shot in the head.  He said it knocked him out cold.  He said it wasn’t pleasant getting shot in the head, but he was downtown in Mosul back in the action when I asked about it.  Army Lieutenant Colonel Terry Jamison also got shot in the helmet in the same city, Mosul.  When I asked LTC Jamison about getting shot while flying his Kiowa Warrior helicopter, he said the bullet somehow missed his head but ventilated his helmet.  (I saw the helmet.)  Pilots wear light helmets because of the hard turns, plus some high-G accidents can cause neck injuries.

Lieutenant Colonel Eric Murphy is an A-10 pilot from Baltimore.

Lt Col Murphy flies with the 104th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron from the Maryland National Guard.  In his day job, “Captain” Eric Murphy is a commercial pilot who flies A320s but today he’s not flying British tourists traveling within the United States.  He’s going to Helmand Province to cover the British “Royal Welsh.”  I remembered some Royal Welsh from Iraq.  There had been much fighting.  A lot of killing that went both ways.  They had been Men of Valor.http://www.michaelyon-online.com/men-of-valor-part-i-of-about-viii.htm

As Lt Col Murphy crawled in, I wished him luck in covering the British, but didn’t say that some of those British soldiers are my personal friends.  It was good to see the A-10s heading out there.  The Brits appreciate it.

Flare dispensers under each wing.

A-10s have more tricks than Harry Potter, such as the flares designed to lure heat-seeking missiles away from the engines.  Over these battlefields, pilots often pop the flares as “We see you” warnings to the enemy.  If the enemy is in the open and no civilians are around, they are unlikely to get a friendly flare warning, but sometimes it’s better to hold off on the big weapons; the enemy might be fighting from a built-up area.

Today, Lt Col Murphy’s 30mm cannon is loaded with 1,150 rounds.  The 30mm can destroy tanks, but believe it or not, typically will not penetrate the walls around Afghan homes.  When the 30mm fires, it’s almost unbelievable.  The bullets don’t fly in a laser-like stream, but sort of spray in a lethal mist, as if the cannon is shot-painting a swath with huge bullets.  If the enemy is in the open, the cannon is like a weapon of mass destruction.  When people are hit with M-16 bullets, the wound is often more like a couple small holes, but when bodies get hit with weapons this large, they fly in pieces.

A-10 cannons are tilted down so that the pilot can fly level while strafing.  This is important: In Mosul, in 2004, an F-14 was strafing downtown after a massive truck bomb in December and many other bad surprises (I was not there), and the pilot told me he was fixated on the target.  Since the F-14 cannon is tilted up for “Top Gun” air combat, the pilot had to nose down the F-14 and was diving straight into the target and nearly crashed.  The hard turn to avoid crashing damaged his aircraft and the pilot had difficulty landing on the aircraft carrier later that night.  Since the A-10 gun is tilted down, it can fly level and strafe without accidentally crashing into the target.

Lt Cols Tim Eddins and Eric Murphy climb up the telescoping ladder into their jets and go through one of many checklists.  Watching Air Force missions and all the checklists is reminiscent of watching space launches.  Checklist after checklist of obscure terms.  Occasionally they say things normal people might recognize, like “brakes.”

---

Meanwhile, highly trained ground crews check, check, and recheck.  And then check again.  They checked so many times that it was hard to keep up.

Each of the two Warthogs carried 8x BLU 19 IR (infrared) illumination flares, which can be used to help helicopters land on dark nights.  Our special operations helicopters don’t need any ambient light to fly in the dark.  They could fly in a cave if the cave were big enough.  But most of U.S. helicopters need some light to see the ground, and on nights too dark to fly (called “red illum” by the aviators), someone needs to light up the landing zone.  The helicopters can turn on their own IR lights, but it can be preferable to have artillery, mortars, or, say, Warthogs illuminate for you.

Each Warthog also carried 7x 2.75” White Phosphorous marking rockets; 2x GBU 38 satellite-guided 500lb bombs; 1x GBU 12 500lb LGB.  [GBU = Guided Bomb Unit; LGB = Laser Guided Bomb.]

Just before the aircraft goes to the runway, they arm the 30mm cannon (you have to stand out of the way just in case), and all the strange weapons.  The weapons specialists pull out the red tags and store the tags in the aircraft.

For the ground crews and pilots, mistakes are unacceptable.  Period.

During his day job, Lt Col Eddins pilots Boeing 777 jets for United to places like China.  He said he likes traveling to China.

(Murphy and Eddins both fly for United.  It’s a comfort knowing so many military pilots are up front when your loved ones fly; remember when former Air Force pilot Chesley Sullenberger flew his A320 through a flock of birds and landed in the Hudson River?  He got everyone out alive.)

Red tags were off: pilots Murphy and Eddins were ready to roll.

They taxied to the nearby runway.

The Warthogs had to wait for a Reaper to roll by.  No telling where Mr. iRobot would fly to.  Do these go to Pakistan?  I have no idea, but it seems like you can’t read the news without seeing where these robots have hit more terrorists.  There was a time when the enemy thought terror was a one-way street.

This place has gotten to be like a hornet’s nest of Predators and Reapers.  A couple years ago, you’d see them every day, but now you can’t turn around without seeing an iRobot Terminator buzzing around to land or disappearing into the sunset or sunrise.

UAVs are very useful, but come with sharp limitations.  They are great hammers when you need a hammer, but they’re still hammers when you need a wrench.  For example, UAVs can’t guard bridges against suicide bombers.  They have limited, pinprick firepower other than for small targets.  They are useless in poor weather.  UAVs are but one sort of tool in a great big tool chest.

---

Pilots Eddins and Murphy rolled out to the taxiway and got in queue for takeoff.  At the front of the queue are a couple commercial jets, then the Reaper, then some kind of electronic warfare machine, then Murphy and Eddins in their Warthogs.  This is just a pinhole view of Kandahar Airfield.  There are more helicopters here than in Apocalypse Now.  Captain Kristen Duncan and I watched dozens and dozens of aircraft take off and land.  Name it.  Everything from 747s to Stealth UAVs come in here.  Afghan, British, Canadian, Danish, Dutch, Belgian—the list keeps going.

Eddins and Murphy finally rolled away and took off to cover the British Royal Welsh.

The sun set but the war kept going.

Later that night, Captain Duncan and I went back to the A-10s.  Lt Cols Eddins and Murphy returned with all their bombs and bullets.  Two other Warthogs were prepared to slip into the night.

Everything was checked.

Rechecked and rechecked.

Finally it was time.

The Warthogs flew away under a big moon, which leaves us with one final thought.  When the moon is this bright, you can use a signal mirror to alert the Warthog pilots of your position.  Something to keep in mind.

 

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AMSTERDAM - De populaire Duitse weerman Jörg Kachelmann (51) is zaterdag gearresteerd op verdenking van verkrachting. Dat melden Duitse media. (15:09, 23-03-10)

Monterrey.- El gobernador Rodrigo Medina de la Cruz se reunió esta mañana en privado con su gabinete de seguridad y el rector del Tecnológico de Monterrey, Rafael Rangel Sostmann, luego de confirmarse la muerte de dos estudiantes durante un enfrentamiento entre militares y sicarios el viernes anterior.

Al encuentro realizado en Palacio de Gobierno asistieron el secretario de Seguridad Pública, Luis Carlos Treviño Berchelmann, y el procurador general de Justicia estatal, Alejandro Garza y Garza.

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NUEVA YORK, 21 (EUROPA PRESS)

A pesar de el combate contra el cultivo de opio que fue uno de los argumentos esgrimidos para la última gran ofensiva de las fuerzas de la OTAN en Marjah, en el sur de Afganistán, ahora los altos mandos aliados defienden la decisión de no aplicar la política de erradicación de las plantaciones de amapola.

"Las fuerzas estadounidenses ya no erradican", afirmó el general Stanley McChrystal, comandante de la Fuerza Internacional para la Asistencia a la Seguridad en Afganistán (ISAF). Anteriormente señalado como fuente de financiación de los talibán, la OTAN sostiene ahora que supone el sustento para entre el 60 y el 70 por ciento de los agricultores de Marjah.

Los 'marines', que tomaron el pasado 12 de febrero Marjah, principal bastión talibán en el sur afgano, patrullan ahora la zona con órdenes expresas de no intervenir en las plantaciones. Incluso dialogan con los agricultores para ofrecerles incentivos a cambio de que abandonen el cultivo de amapola. Así, les ofrecen pagarles el valor de la próxima cosecha a cambio de la destrucción de la misma y la plantación de cultivos legales.

"Marjah es un caso especial. No queremos llevarnos por delante el medio de vida de aquéllos a quienes nos queremos ganar", explicó uno de los miembros del grupo de asesoramiento estratégico de McChrystal, el mayor Jeffrey Eggers, en declaraciones a 'The New York Times'.

La ONU coincide con este análisis, pero es consciente de la paradoja. Las fotos de militares extranjeros "caminando junto a los campos de opio no irá bien para la audiencia afgana, pero la perspectiva de aplazar la erradicación en este caso concreto está presente", indicó el responsable de la Oficina de Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Crimen en Afganistán, Jean-Luc Lemahieu.

Aunque la ISAF como tal ya no lleva a cabo operaciones de fumigación de cultivos, las autoridades provinciales afganas sí que encabezan toda una campaña para luchar contra la amapola. Una de las figuras más destacadas de esta campaña contra el cultivo es el gobernador de Helmand --provincia en la que se encuentra Marjah--, Gulab Mangal, no duda en jactarse de haber logrado una reducción de un tercio del opio en 2009. También él defiende una moratoria.

"En general mis superiores me han dicho que este año no habrá erradicaciones allí porque la gente ha sufrido muchas dificultades debido a los combates. Lo haremos el año que viene", afirmó.

Sin embargo, el portavoz del Ministerio Antinarcóticos del Gobierno afgano, Zulmai Afzali, afirmó que esperan imponer su postura y erradicar la amapola de Marjah. "Si me lo ordenan, comenzaré con la destrucción del opio de Marjah ese mismo día", dijo.

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Gerald Frushon, right, and Pvt. Samuel Lima, provide security during a school assessment in Wesh, Afghanistan, March 16, 2010. Frushon and Lima are assigned to C Troop, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Francisco V. Govea II

Tiltorotor Squadron 365 MV-22 Osprey at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif. to fly out to Range 210 to conduct the Clear, Hold, Build Exercise, March 3, 2010. Tthe Marines are assigned to Company I, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Mark Fayloga<</span>!>

U.S. Army soldiers prepare to move from cover during an attack by anti-Afghan forces in the Tantil village in eastern Afghanistan's Kunar province, March 13, 2010. The soldiers are assigned to Company D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment. Afghan National Security Forces and International Security Assistance Forces visited the community and its elders in response to a high number of recent attacks in the area.U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Gary A. Witte

KABİL (A.A) - Afganistan'ın güneyindeki Helmand vilayetinde düzenlenen intihar saldırısında 10 kişinin öldüğü, 7 kişinin yaralandığı bildirildi.

Kabul.- Un atacante suicida mató a 10 civiles e hirió a siete más en la provincia sureña de Helmand, informaron el domingo autoridades afganas.

El atacante tenía como objetivo una patrulla del ejército afgano que se encontraba en un puente de Gereshk, una población al norte de Lashkar Gah, la capital de la provincia, dijo el vocero provincial Dawood Ahmadi. El vocero agrego que la mayoría de los muertos eran vendedores que trabajaban en la carretera.

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This story was co-published with Newsweek.

Mohammad Moqim watches in despair as his men struggle with their AK-47 automatic rifles, doing their best to hit man-size targets 50 meters away. A few of the police trainees lying prone in the mud are decent shots, but the rest shoot clumsily, and fumble as they try to reload their weapons. The Afghan National Police (ANP) captain sighs as he dismisses one group of trainees and orders 25 more to take their places on the firing line. "We are still at zero," says Captain Moqim, 35, an eight-year veteran of the force. "They don't listen, are undisciplined, and will never be real policemen."

Poor marksmanship is the least of it. Worse, crooked Afghan cops supply much of the ammunition used by the Taliban, according to Saleh Mohammed, an insurgent commander in Helmand province. The bullets and rocket-propelled grenades sold by the cops are cheaper and of better quality than the ammo at local markets, he says. It's easy for local cops to concoct credible excuses for using so much ammunition, especially because their supervisors try to avoid areas where the Taliban are active. Mohammed says local police sometimes even stage fake firefights so that if higher-ups question their outsize orders for ammo, villagers will say they've heard fighting.

America has spent more than $6 billion since 2002 in an effort to create an effective Afghan police force, buying weapons, building police academies, and hiring defense contractors to train the recruits&mdash;but the program has been a disaster. More than $322 million worth of invoices for police training were approved even though the funds were poorly accounted for, according to a government audit, and fewer than 12 percent of the country's police units are capable of operating on their own. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the State Department's top representative in the region, has publicly called the Afghan police "an inadequate organization, riddled with corruption." During the Obama administration's review of Afghanistan policy last year, "this issue received more attention than any other except for the question of U.S. troop levels," Holbrooke later told NEWSWEEK. "We drilled down deep into this."

The worst of it is that the police are central to Washington's plans for getting out of Afghanistan. The U.S.-backed government in Kabul will never have popular support if it can't keep people safe in their own homes and streets. Yet in a United Nations poll last fall, more than half the Afghan respondents said the police are corrupt. Police commanders have been implicated in drug trafficking, and when U.S. Marines moved into the town of Aynak last summer, villagers accused the local police force of extortion, assault, and rape.

The public's distrust of the cops is palpable in the former insurgent stronghold of Marja. Village elders welcomed the U.S. Marines who recently drove out the Taliban, but told the Americans flatly they don't want the ANP to return. "The people of Marja will tell you that one of their greatest fears was the police coming back," says Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, who took over in November as chief of the U.S. program to expand and improve Afghanistan's security forces. "You constantly hear these stories about who was worse: the Afghan police that were there or the Taliban." The success of America's counterinsurgency strategy depends on the cops, who have greater contact with local communities than the Army does. "This is not about seizing land or holding terrain; it's about the people," says Caldwell. "You have to have a police force that the people accept, believe in, and trust."

More than a year after Barack Obama took office, the president is still discovering how bad things are. At a March 12 briefing on Afghanistan with his senior advisers, he asked whether the police will be ready when America's scheduled drawdown begins in July 2011, according to a senior official who was in the room. "It's inconceivable, but in fact for eight years we weren't training the police," replied Caldwell, taking part in the meeting via video link from Afghanistan. "We just never trained them before. All we did was give them a uniform." The president looked stunned. "Eight years," he said. "And we didn't train police? It's mind-boggling." The room was silent.

Efforts to build a post-Taliban police force have been plagued from the start by unrealistic goals, poor oversight, and slapdash hiring. Patrolmen were recruited locally, issued weapons, and placed on the beat with little or no formal training. Most of their techniques have been picked up on the job&mdash;including plenty of ugly habits. Even now, Caldwell says, barely a quarter of the 98,000-member force has received any formal instruction. The people who oversaw much of the training that did take place were contractors&mdash;many of them former American cops or sheriffs. They themselves had little proper direction, and the government officials overseeing their activities did not bother to examine most expenses under $3,000, leaving room for abuse. Amazingly, no single agency or individual ever had control of the training program for long, so lines of accountability were blurred.

Coalition efforts to build an Afghan police force were painfully slow at first. By 2003 the U.S. State Department decided to speed things up by deploying the Virginia-based defense contractor DynCorp International, which had held previous contracts to train police officers in Kosovo and Haiti. The company began setting up a string of training centers across the country. After the Defense Department took a role in overseeing that work in 2005, it squabbled constantly with State over whether the training should emphasize police work or counterinsurgency.

Neither the State Department nor DynCorp was prepared for the job they faced. Most of the recruits are rural villagers who have never been inside a classroom. Roughly 15 percent test positive for drugs, primarily hashish. Few know how to use a toothbrush or drive, and nearly 90 percent are illiterate. In 2005 DynCorp opened a new police academy on the outskirts of Jalalabad, and within a few months the academy's drains backed up. Maintenance workers discovered that the septic tanks were full of smooth stones&mdash;a toilet-paper substitute used by many rural Afghans. DynCorp had to bring in backhoes to repair the problem, and the company had to add two days of classes in basic hygiene.

The ANP still takes just about anyone who applies. "Our recruits are unemployed youth with no education and no prospects," says Police Col. Mohammad Hashim Babakarkhil, deputy commander of Kabul's central police-training center. Since January 2007, upwards of 2,000 police have been killed in action&mdash;more than twice the figure for Afghan Army soldiers. U.S. officers say as many as half the police casualties were a result of firearms accidents and traffic collisions.

It's practically impossible to produce competent police officers in a program of only eight weeks, says a former senior DynCorp executive, requesting anonymity because he continues to work in the industry. But that was the time frame State and Defense set for the course. "They were not going to be trained police officers. We knew that. They knew that," the former executive says. "It was a numbers game." In fact, the course has now been cut from eight weeks to six in order to squeeze in more trainees. ("We believe the training is appropriate under the circumstances," says Assistant Secretary of State David Johnson. DynCorp spokesman Douglas Ebner says the basic-training course is part of a more extensive 40-week program, and is supported by further "field monitoring, mentoring, and advising." Training hours have been extended to make up for the lost weeks, he says. DynCorp does "not make the policies, recruit the police candidates, or design the program," he adds, saying the company has "fully met" its objective of providing highly qualified police trainers.)

Whether or not recruits have mastered their subjects, almost everyone graduates. Even if they fail the firearms test, they're issued a weapon and put on the street. Only the Interior Ministry can flunk a candidate, and that rarely happens. "There were a lot of Afghans who seemed to have some patriotism and wanted to make their country better," recalls Tracy Jeansonne, a former deputy sheriff from Louisiana who worked for DynCorp from May 2006 to June 2008. "But a lot of the police officers wanted to be able to extort money from locals. If we caught them, we'd suggest they be removed. But we couldn't fire anybody. We could only make suggestions."

A former midlevel DynCorp official calls the program "dysfunctional." Requesting anonymity because he doesn't want problems with his former employer, he displays dozens of weekly reports sent to State and military officials; almost all include some mention of an Afghan police officer or commander as "corrupt." Yet of the 170,000 or so Afghans trained under the program since its inception, only about 30,000 remain on the force, according to State and Defense officials. "In terms of retention and attrition, we can say there's a problem," says Steve Kraft, who oversees the program for the State Department. The cops' base salary and hazardous-duty pay were recently raised to match Afghan Army levels, but no one knows if those changes are really helping. "Once they leave the training center, we currently don't know whether they stay with the force or quit," Kraft says. "The bottom line is, we just don't know."

And what has become of all the billions of dollars this program has cost America? Government investigators aren't entirely sure. Fundamental questions are raised in an audit of the Afghan police-training program released in February by the State and Defense departments' inspectors general. When State finally sent an "invoice-reconciliation team" to review expense receipts submitted under one particular contract, it discovered that $322 million in invoices had been "approved even though they were not allowable, allocable, or reasonable." What's more, the auditors said, half those invoices included errors.

The lapses don't stop there. The audit says State Department officials "did not conduct adequate surveillance for two task orders in excess of $1 billion." According to the auditors, State's contract supervisors didn't adequately oversee the use of government-owned property, failed to maintain contract files properly, and sometimes neglected to "match goods to receiving reports"&mdash;meaning, evidently, that they didn't verify that the U.S. government had actually received the goods it had paid for. (DynCorp's Ebner responds: "We are fully engaged with the Department of State to ensure complete and thorough reconciliation of all invoices, and recognize and welcome the emphasis on sufficient oversight personnel to complete this process.")

Those failures should have been no surprise. The audit also found that State routinely short-staffed its contract-monitoring office in Afghanistan. At one point, only three contract officers were on the ground overseeing DynCorp's $1.7 billion training contract. A former DynCorp official who worked in Afghanistan, asking not to be named because he remains in the government contracting business, says he asked the State Department repeatedly for concrete goals for the police contract but never got firm answers. "I'd ask them: 'Please explain to me what a successful training program was. What are the standards you want us to apply?' There was no vision for the future." (Assistant Secretary Johnson says, "From the start, our training program was based on a clear, professionally developed curriculum ... A simple head count of the number of individuals on the ground ignores the substantial back-office support our contract oversight personnel had from Washington.")

A new set of difficulties arose last summer. Caldwell's predecessor, Gen. Richard Formica, decided that Defense should take direct control of the training contract. To avoid a lengthy bidding competition, he suggested folding the police-training mission into an existing anti-drug and counterterrorism program overseen by the U.S. Army's Space and Missile Defense Command. Bids were limited to companies already under contract to the missile command, effectively shutting out DynCorp. In the end, only two firms wound up bidding: Northrop Grumman and Xe Services, formerly known as Blackwater.

DynCorp fought back. In December the company filed a formal protest to block the Defense Department from seizing control of the contract. Last week the Government Accountability Office upheld DynCorp's complaint and suggested that the competition be open to all comers, including DynCorp as well as Xe and Northrop. DynCorp's CEO, William Ballhaus, recently told investors that the company's contract had been extended until July in any case; now it seems the new bidding process will take much longer.

At Kabul's police training center, a team of 35 Italian carabinieri recently arrived to supplement DynCorp's efforts. Before the Italians showed up at the end of January for a one-year tour, the recruits were posting miserable scores on the firing range. But the Italians soon discovered that poor marksmanship wasn't the only reason: the sights of the AK-47 and M-16 rifles the recruits were using were badly out of line. "We zeroed all their weapons," says Lt. Rolando Tommasini. "It's a very important thing, but no one had done this in the past. I don't know why."

The Italians also had a different way of teaching the recruits to shoot. DynCorp's instructors started their firearms training with 20-round clips at 50 meters; the recruits couldn't be sure at first if they were even hitting the target. Instead the carabinieri started them off with just three bullets each and a target only seven meters away. The recruits would shoot, check the target, and be issued three more rounds. When they began gaining confidence, the distance was gradually increased to 15, then 30, and then 50 meters. On a recent day on the firing range only one of 73 recruits failed the shooting test. The Italians say that's a huge improvement. (DynCorp says its civilian police advisers are "highly qualified"; the average trainer has more than a decade of law-enforcement experience.)

Caldwell also says it's just easier to work with paramilitary police units, such as the Italians and the French gendarmerie, than with contractors. Active-duty police units have a coherent and disciplined chain of command, Caldwell says. "When I bring in a contractor unit I'm getting a different group of folks," he says. "It may be someone who was a state patrolman, a local sheriff, or a policeman from New York City, each operating under different standards and with different backgrounds." Everything has to be negotiated. "If I say to my contractor that I want to make a change, he may say, 'Well, I'm not sure if that's really the best way,' " says Caldwell. "But if I can bring in a gendarmerie force, they're ready to go ... and take instructions well."

By the end of October, Caldwell hopes to build the force to 109,000 members, including an "elite unit" that so far has roughly 4,900 members. That outfit is called the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). It'll be used for particularly sensitive assignments like Marja. ANCOP members get 16 weeks of training, and they're required to have at least a third-grade proficiency in reading and writing. So far, reviews from Marja are mixed. "The new police are more organized, committed, responsible, and helpful than the previous police, who were more like a criminal gang," Assadullah, a school principal, tells newsweek. (Like many Afghans, he uses only one name.) Local shopkeeper Hajji Noruddin Khan disagrees. "We are as disappointed with the new police as we were with the old police," he complains.

Quality matters. "In the rush to increase the number of trained police officers, we must remember that the end goal is a civilian police force capable of promoting good government, not a paramilitary adjunct for the counterinsurgency fight," warns Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, the top U.S. Marine commander in southern Afghanistan, puts it more succinctly: "I'd rather have one well-trained cop than 10 untrained." Besides, the fact is that no one is quite sure how many Afghan police there really are. The Americans are only now in the process of trying to create a database that will positively identify and track recruits. Without such data, it's more than difficult to catch "ghost" troops who exist only as names on the payroll, not to mention possible Taliban infiltrators.

But the buildup continues, and so does the training. On the firing range just outside Kabul, one of the few decent marksmen is Khair Mohammad, an illiterate 24-year-old from northern Afghanistan. "I've already had a lot of practice shooting at the Taliban," he says. He's been a cop for two years, serving one year in Kandahar and another on checkpoints just outside Marja. "I lost a lot of friends in the fighting," he says. Now he's getting his first taste of formal training, and hoping to join ANCOP. He figures he'd earn about double the $180 a month (including combat pay) he's been getting. His trainers are doing their best to make him worth the extra salary. "One thing the police don't know is good relations with the people," says Carabinieri Lt. Col. Massimo Deiana. "We're trying to train them to respect and relate to people." If such a skill is teachable at all, it could be far more important in the long run than knowing how to shoot straight.

With Sami Yousafzai in Kabul

Kai Eide, the former UN envoy to Afghanistan, has criticised the Pakistani government’s decision to arrest high level Taliban leaders, saying that this has resulted in the collapse of a clandestine diplomatic back channel between the militants and the UN. In what was the first official confirmation that such talks with the Taliban had taken place, Eide revealed that he had personally met with senior leaders who acted with the authority of the Quetta Shura, the movement’s high command.

Eide said that these talks included senior members of Harmid Karzai’s administration and speculated that such high level contacts could not have been carried out without the approval of Mullah Omar, thought to be the Taliban's highest ranked leader. Although Eide conceded that the talks were in their infancy,  he said that the year old discussions had been making progress prior to the arrests. It is still unclear what led the Pakistani government to order the arrest of a dozen Taliban leadership figures in recent weeks, but they have stated that they had no intention to damage the talks.

Eide’s revelations came shortly after the announcement of a new coalition offensive against the Taliban’s stronghold of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Commander of US and NATO troops in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, said that the operation to secure the country’s second largest city had already begun. In addition to its military dimension, consultations have been launched with tribal elders and community leaders with the intention of expanding good governance to the villages in the region.

The openSecurity verdict: Events at the end of the week provided an illuminating insight into the twin track strategy being pursued by the Obama administration in Afghanistan. Kai Eide’s revelations, although referring to a recent failure of the diplomatic process, make startlingly clear the depth and duration of contacts between international agencies and a Taliban leadership that, until very recently, was considered beyond negotiating with. It is to be hoped that the disruption of the talks was a genuine misstep on the part of Pakistani authorities, responding to US pressure to be more proactive in tackling the Islamist guerrillas operating from their territory.

Militarily, operation Moshtarak’s apparent success in driving the Taliban back in Helmand has paved the way for an offensive against Kandahar. Such a move has enormous symbolic importance, Kandahar being both the birthplace of the Taliban movement and the de facto seat of their national government between 1996 and 2001. With another, more modest, operation planned for the northern province of Kunduz, the stage is set for the further extension of Kabul's authority, though how long their authority will last is uncertain.

The key to success will remain the diplomatic route. If Mullah Omar himself, caricatured at the height of the ‘war on terror’ as an irrational fanatic, is open to discussions on this issue, there seems no practical reason why Afghanistan cannot move forward. If the US strategy’s underlying assumptions are valid, the increasing military pressure on the Taliban will bring them back to the table regardless of the arrests in Pakistan. The key task will be to ensure that this window of opportunity is fully exploited, before the security gains are eroded by the lack of manpower and government capacity which continues to erode Kabul's appeal, and the military tide turns back in the Taliban’s favour.

Middle east Quartet calls for Israel settlement halt

It was reported on Friday that, after a meeting in Moscow, representatives from the UN, EU, Russia and the US, the so-called ‘Quartet’, issued a joint statement strongly condemning Israel’s announced construction of 1,600 housing units in east Jerusalem. The group, which included EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, called for a freeze on all settlement activity, the dismantling of settlements built after 2001 and Israel’s engagement in peace talks that would aim to create an independent state within two years, predicated by the withdrawal of Israeli military forces and civilians from land occupied since the 1967 war.

They also called for an end to the Israeli siege of Gaza. Ashton, on a visit to the beleaguered territory, is reported to have been horrified, describing it as ‘worse than Haiti’. The announcement comes after US and Israeli diplomats unofficially described the current state of relations between the two countries as at their lowest ebb since 1975.

Burmese army sustains casualties fighting northern rebels

On Friday, a spokesman for the Burmese rebel Shan State Army claimed that twenty government troops had been killed in an ambush carried out on 13 March. The ambush, which was launched in the Nam Zam township in the northern Shan state, aimed to deter government forces from launching an offensive to disarm the rebel groups. The spokesman, Sao Lao Seng, said the firefight had lasted for three hours and that no rebels had been killed in the action. The Myanmar regime has not commented on the statement and there has been no mention of it in the heavily controlled state media.

The Shan state, which borders China, Thailand and Laos, has long enjoyed de facto autonomy within Myanmar and is dominated by armed groups representing a diverse patchwork of ethnic minorities. A tenuous ceasefire between the Myanmar junta and several notable rebel groups had held for twenty years before the mobilisation of government troops in the region sparked renewed hostilities last year. Although the junta has persuaded six of the ethnic groups to disarm, it is unlikely to repeat this success with the larger factions, all of which have refused offers to join the political process, stating that they have nothing to gain from demobilisation.

oD-wide classification

Country: 

Myanmar

Israel

Palestine

Afghanistan

City: 

Kandahar

Topics: 

Conflict

International politics

Kabul.- La Policía afgana mató hoy a dos mujeres que intentaron irrumpir, con chalecos cargados de explosivos, en una ONG financiada por Estados Unidos en la provincia sureña de Helmand, informó el Ministerio de Interior.

Las dos mujeres planeaban atacar la sede de la ONG en la capital helmandí, Lashkar Gah, pero la Policía las interceptó y en el consiguiente tiroteo ambas perdieron la vida, según un comunicado de Interior.

Las atacantes iban ataviadas con vestimenta femenina, aunque Interior no determinó si llevaban el tradicional 'burka' u otras prendas.

Durante el tiroteo no se registró ninguna otra víctima.

Desde el 13 de febrero, unos 15.000 soldados internacionales y afganos llevan a cabo una gran operación antitalibán en el distrito de Nad Alí, en Helmand.

Aunque los combates tienen lugar en varias zonas del distrito, su epicentro es la localidad de Marjah, situada a unos 25 kilómetros de Lashkar Gah.

Western leaders claim there's a connection between the bloody war in Afghanistan and "extremist safe havens" in Pakistan. The Economist's central Asia correspondent heads to the borderlands ...

From THE ECONOMIST online

As I walk through the bazaars of Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, it is easy to think there is nothing wrong. I struggle through the crowds and pass mounds of spices in great brown sacks, birds trilling in pink cages and tiny old men struggling to restrain honking donkeys and whooping boys. Trade is brisk, and many of the shopkeepers, spotting a foreigner, grin and call out “How are you, Mister?”

But round the next corner is a different scene: a large building has had its front blown out, littering the street with bricks and slabs of concrete. “Suicide bomb yesterday,” explains Kausar, a local. “Many died. The people are scared&mdash;every week there is a new attack. They slaughter us even in the bazaars now.” Their attacks have been unrelenting: on March 5th, in the Hangu district of the North-West Frontier Province, a convoy of Shiite pilgrims and paramilitary soldiers was attacked by a suicide bomber. Twelve people were killed and more than 300 injured.

Theories abound as to who Mr Kausar’s “they” are. “They are Blackwater operatives,” says Dr Naveed Irfan, a prominent psychiatrist whose house was damaged by one recent explosion. “That is why they never recover the body.” He is equally confident about Osama bin Laden. “I met him once. Al-Qaeda is not a terrorist network. It is a conspiracy by the Americans to destabilise our country.” Similar theories are aired regularly by Pakistan’s newspapers and TV channels. This is a country in denial.

In recent months, international attention has been concentrated on the open warfare waged in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand province. But far from the borderlands around Kandahar, the battle for “hearts and minds” rages on in the other major Pushtun-majority region, the vast area between Peshawar in Pakistan and Jalalabad in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama and every other Western leader involved in the war with Taliban have emphasised the importance of “recognising the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan, and the extremist safe havens in Pakistan.” I undertook this trip to learn something about that connection.

At Islamia College, a prestigious institution with buildings and grounds like an English public school’s, I meet a young man who is reading for his master’s in political science. He does not know who is behind the bombings in Peshawar, but he has convictions about the fighting over the border. “The Americans have no right to be there,” he insists. “They invaded Afghanistan and Iraq because they wanted bases next to Iran and China.” We are interrupted by a college lecturer who insists on convincing me of his love for English literature by listing his favourite books (practically the entire Western canon, it seems). He assures me that Pakistan “wants to march with the rest of the world.” The student scowls.

For lunch, I drive to the outskirts of the city to meet Sikander Afridi, a tribal chief. His compound is just beyond the Smugglers’ Bazaar, whose stalls sell everything from narcotics and fake dollars to World Food Programme biscuits (“Gift of Germany&mdash;not for individual sale”) and British and American military uniforms. Ordinary police have no authority here in the Khyber Agency, part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). A bodyguard ushers me into Mr Afridi’s office, decorated with Islamic calligraphy and submachine guns. The chief himself lies on a long sofa. Lunch turns out to be a Nestl&eacute; cereal bar, a change at least from curried mutton with plain naan. (As far as I can tell, “Peshwari naan” is a myth propagated by British restaurateurs.)

He invites me to sit next to him with a gesture and takes out his mobile phone. “Look,” he says, selecting a video. The camera zooms in on an elderly man who has had his head chopped off and placed between his legs, a pool of blood spreading rapidly around him. “Taliban did this, Taliban this morning.” Members of his tribe have not been targeted like this before. This afternoon he will chair a shura<</span>!> to decide what to do. As he speaks, he takes a packet of white powder from his pocket, pours some onto his hand and snorts it. (Is it naswar, the Pushtun version of snuff? But naswar’s not white.) “For the stomach,” his bodyguard tells me, smiling.

To meet the Taliban, I need to head deeper into the Khyber Agency. Azam Khan, a local politician, has agreed to take me to one of their

madrassas. A friend of his drives us most of the way, but we have to hail a donkey taxi to take us the final mile. The walls of the madrassa<</span>!> are whitewashed and I feel the force of the mid-day sun as we stand in the courtyard. About 40 young Taliban, 15 to 30 years old, quickly gather around us. Azam introduces me to the centre’s imam, a cold man in his forties who, like those of his students who are old enough, sports an impressive beard. He leads us to an underground classroom where we sit cross-legged in the gloom. A tall man with a black turban joins us: he has recently returned from Kandahar, we are told.The imam explains that his students study the Koran here for eight years: some already have the 6,666 verses completely memorised. The Taliban answer my questions&mdash;yet more conspiracy theories&mdash;and then say they have one for me. “Why are your countrymen trespassing on Muslim soil?” a young man asks. “Why do they slay our Muslim brothers?” I choose my words carefully, explaining how the Americans demanded the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden after September 11th 2001, but were refused. “Listen,” says the young man, his fierce, proud face framed by a short black beard and a white prayer cap. “We are Pushtun people. We live by the Pushtun code. If your enemy came here”&mdash;he gestures towards the sky&mdash;“we would protect you with our lives. It is our duty. So it was when the Americans came for bin Laden.” The imam nods, smiling. “The Taliban said, ‘Give us proof, and we shall hand him over.’ But the Americans did not give the Taliban proof. So it is our duty to protect him, as it is our duty to protect you.”

 

(This is the first instalment of a

correspondent's diary

about Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, published on The Economist online.)

Picture credit:

Umair Mohsin (via Flickr)

Kandahar, Afghanistan
15 March 2010

In David Galula’s 1964 book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, THEORY AND PRACTICE, he states:

“The ideal situation for the insurgent would be a large, land-locked country, shaped like a blunt-tipped star, with jungle-covered mountains along the borders and scattered swamps along the plains, in a temperate zone with a large and dispersed rural population and a primitive economy.”

Mr. Galula described Afghanistan almost perfectly.  Instead of jungle-covered mountains are some of the most extreme folds on Planet Earth: The “abode of snow,” the Himalaya.  Afghan elevations dwarf Mount Rainier, and make the great Colorado Rockies look like the Pygmy Snow Hills. Meanwhile, down in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, Galula’s “swamps” are the “Green Zones,” where most of the current fighting occurs.

Yet the experienced Mr. Galula omitted a crucial factor describing the Afghan war: A heavily armed, warring amalgam of peoples, some of whose national sport and pastime is guerrilla war. British officer John Masters variously described in “Bugles and a Tiger: My life in the Gurkhas” that life, liberty and pursuit of happiness for Afghans includes vendettas, guerrilla warfare and lots of guns.

This weekend, on Saturday night, mass murderers struck.  Taliban terrorists used bombs and other weapons in Kandahar City to murder about 35 people.  They wounded another five dozen, and damaged about forty homes, according to reports.  Enthusiasm to commit wholesale murder is one of the enemy’s prime weaknesses.

About 12 miles from the suicide attacks on Saturday night, is the runway at Kandahar Airfield, where operations continue every minute of the day.

Recently, two Belgian F-16s taxied to the runway, engines roaring, like a dragon with a foot caught in a trap.  The first pilot rolled from the hanger area then parked just off the runaway.  Under the cockpit, the single engine sucked air and dust, mixing oxygen with fuel, as combusted gases shot from the nozzle, bending light on the runway.

While the Belgian fighters wait, a Russian jet from parts unknown roars in, screeches down, and rolls far down the runway.   It’s time for the F-16 to launch, prepared to bring space-aged, often satellite-guided weapons, to stone-aged enemies who sometimes are so uneducated that they don’t understand how to impregnate their wives.  For some, their only sexual experiences are with boys, men, and animals.  In years gone by, many people seemed to imagine suicide attackers were the ultimate expression of commitment.  Today, we see suicide attackers for what they are: Stooges.  Ignorant suicide bombers are not brave martyrs, but gullible Man Dogs trained to fetch myths.   The Taliban select and condition Man Dogs as precision guided weapons.  They are myth guided munitions.

A windsock speaks for the wind while lights speak for the dust.

Part scream and part roar, the whining engine creates a painful mixture of noises as the first Belgian F-16 rolls into start position.

When the pilot throttles up, the engine stops screaming.  The rumble can be heard from miles away.

Brakes released.

Scorching gases bend light, creating ephemeral beauty lasting only seconds in the dark Afghan night.

---

The art, a heat painting on canvas of air and dust, conjured Van Gogh’s Starry Night for a private audience, and disappeared forever.

Random helicopter with refueling proboscis.

Predator returning to the lair.

Predators can carry two Hellfire missiles.  This Predator has only one.  Maybe the missile was fired or, maybe the Predator was launched with only one Hellfire (can carry two) to conserve fuel and increase range or loiter time.

Predator with two Hellfire missiles.  Notice the inverted “V” of the tail.  The tail on Reapers is like a normal “V.”

Reaper with “V” tail.

Reaper passes over with four Hellfire missiles and two smart bombs.

Though the Man Dogs succeeded on Saturday night, their trainers are being hunted down and killed.

Join me for updates and other content at Facebook and Twitter.

 

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The newest subtitled versions of LTC (ret.) Allen West’s speech at CPAC are Hebrew and German.

Col. West delivered this speech in Washington D.C. on February 19, 2010, at the launch of the Freedom Defense Initiative, which was organized by Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer.

Many thanks to JLH and ESW for the German translation, to DarLink for the Hebrew translation, and to Vlad Tepes for the subtitling. A full transcript in each language is below the jump.

The full list of languages:

Albanian	German	Russian *
Arabic *	Greek *	Serbian †
Czech †	Hebrew	Spanish
Danish	Italian	Swedish *
Dutch	Portuguese
French	Romanian

(* = assigned but not yet received; † = received but not yet subtitled)

If you want to volunteer for a language not listed above, please email me at unspiek (at) chromatism.net, and I’ll send out a time-stamped English-language transcript as a text file.

Hebrew translation by DarLink


German translation by JLH and ESW

- - - - - - - - -
Hebrew translation by DarLink

00:00.02		הדות
00:04.07		…הבר הדות
00:08.11		רדהנ הז - טרבורל םגו המדקה לע ךל הדומ ינא, הלאמאפו
00:12.12		…םא :דחא רבד םכלוכל דיגהל הצור קר ינאו םכתא דחי םויה ןאכ תויהל
00:16.17		רצעמ תיבל יתוא וסינכתש יאדכ ,האנש ירבדל הווש תויהל הכפה תמא
00:20.20		.קותשל ןווכתמ אל ינאש ינפמ
00:24.27
00:28.32		.הנידמה ןוחטב אוה תינרמשה הגלפמה לש חתפמה יאשונמ דחא
00:32.34		…הז ,אשונה לע םירבדמו םויה ןאכ םיאצמנ ונחנאש הדבועו
00:36.38		היתונורקע לע תדמועה תינרמשה הגהנההמ הפצמ יאקירמאה םעהש םירבדהמ דחא
00:40.41		… םוקנ אל םא. םהילע רומשל תנמ לע, תושעל
00:44.46		,ונחנא ימ זירכנ אלו וזה הבושחה הדיעוב
00:48.49		…ובג תא הנפי יאקירמאה םעה ,וזה היעבה תאו בצמה תא םיניבמ ונחנאשו
00:52.51		,םויה ןאכ םיאור םתאש םינרמשה םיגיהנמהמ ןובשחו ןיד שורדל םכילע. ונילא
00:56.57		.םכילא רומשל תנמ לע םיעצמאב טוקנל
01:00.59		.יתבשקהו ןאכ רוחאמ יתבשי יכ םירבד המכ ריבסהל יל ושרת וישכע
01:04.60		המחלמ" רבד הזכ ןיא. "רורטב המחלמ" םירמואה םישנאמ יל סאמנ
01:08.64		היה הז םכח המכ הינשה םלועה תמחלמב. "רורטב
01:12.67		.קזב תמחלמ םע המחלמב ונחנאש םירמוא ויה הקירמא לש תירבה תוצרא וליא
01:16.69		ךלת אל המוא. הזקימק יסייט םע המחלמב ונחנאש וא
01:20.72		,ךכ קוידיב. הקיטקט דגנ המחלמל
01:24.74		…ונלש םיגטרטסא םיגיהנמ םיאורו ןאכ םיבשוי םתא רשאכ
01:28.79		…לע םירבדמו ןושאר םוי לש תודמולמה תוינכותה לכב םיפתתשמ הריבה ןוטגנישווב
01:32.84		,"םיט"לזמ תופקתה" םילהנמ ונחנאש הז רדהנ המכ
01:36.85		,םאנטייוב הרקש המב םירכזנ םתא
01:40.89		…ןאכ שממ תוצצפה רשיא ןוסנו' ג ןודניל רשאכ
01:44.92		…יגטרטסא גיהנמש המ אל הז, ןבלה תיבמ
01:48.93		.תיגטרטסא הביטקפסרפ הזל ןיא. תושעל רומא
01:52.97		,היגולואידיא דגנ המחלמל תכלוה המוא
01:56.98		.םויה ןאכ םירבדמ ונחנא ךכ לעו
02:01.02		…היגולואידיא דגנ םיבצינ ונחנאש הדבועה לע םירבדמ ונחנא
02:05.05		…המשו תיטילופו תיטרקואית, תירטילאטוט
02:09.06		."םלסיא"
02:13.09
02:17.12
02:21.16		.םימלסומ דגנ אל הז
02:25.18		לכ אל :תיצאנה הינמרגב ומכ קוידיב הז
02:29.20		יתייה רשאכש ומכ קוידיב הז .יצאנ היה ינמרג
02:33.24		… היה יקאריע לכ אל, 2003 ב קאריעב
02:37.26		ןאכ רבדמ ינא. 'תעבה תגלפמב
02:41.30		,622 תנשמ תמייקש היגולואידיא לע
02:45.33		ארקנה עוריאמ הליחתהש ,תיעיבשה האממ
02:49.34		…הכממ חרב ,"הרי'גה" תא השע דמחומש ירחא הרקש, "אלקאנ תטישפ"
02:53.38		תיברעמ היצזיליביצ םע התמעתהש היגולואידיא. זאמ המילא התייהש היגולואידיא. הנידמל
02:57.41		…ךוראה רפסב ףסונ קרפ קר הווהמ הז הרקמו
03:01.42		.ונתיאמ דחא לכ שובכל ידכ םיבתוכ םהש
03:05.46		וניביוא תא חירבהלו דגנכ דומעל םיחרכומ ויה וניתובאש ומכ קוידיב, ונלש ןמז עיגה
03:09.47		.םויהו הרזחב םתוא חירבהלו םוקל םיבייח ונחנא םג ךכ
03:13.51
03:17.55
03:21.56		םישדח תבוטל ןארוק לש םיקלח לוטיב] "הליספ" לע רבדמ [ןילפואק] ןביטס [סומידב ןיעידומה ןיצק] םתעמש
03:25.66		…ומירו ובשי םה רשאכ ,"הייבאדוח םכסה"
03:29.68		627 תוביבסב ושע םהש ומכ, קזחתהל תנמ לע םולש ירבדב הכמ יבשות
03:33.72		סנכיהל חילצה דמחומ ךכ, 628
03:37.75		וישכע שממ הרוק רבד ותוא קוידב. הכמ שובכלו
03:41.75		םיבתכמ בתכ אוה רשאכ. דמחומ לש תרוסמ ןיבהל םיכירצ םתא
03:45.80		,סוילקרהל םיבתכמ בתכ אוה רשאכ ,סרפ רסיק, ארסאקל
03:49.82		,םלסיאל ךתד רימת :השולשמ רחבת " :ורמאש, יטנזיבה רסיקה
03:53.88		?המ ושחנת. "םכתוא גורהל םיאב ונחנאש וא דובעישל סנכית
03:57.92		.רבד ותוא השע ןדאל ןב המסוא, 1992 תוביבסב הרזח
04:01.94		…רתוי רחואמ. הקירמא לש תירבה תוצראל בתכמ חלש אוה
04:05.98		.רבד ותוא קוידב השע ד'גינידמחא דומחמ, 2006 וא 2005 תנשב
04:10.01		…רבכ ונחנא. שוב אישנלו יאקירמאה םעל בתכמ חלש אוה
04:14.02		,תאז ןיבהל תלגוסמש תוגיהנמ ונל היהת אל םאו, תזרכומ המחלמב
04:18.05		הזה ביריה תא ,הזה ביואה תא דומלל הלוכיש
04:22.07		.וזה האלפנה הנידמב ,ןישכע רבכ םוניהיגל ךרדב ונחנא זא
04:26.12		…םכל רמאו דמע ןאכ דחא לכ. ןיבהל םיבייח ונחנא
04:30.14		ונחנאש המ לכל ןיטולחל םידגונמ העירשה יקוחש
04:34.16		…םיגציימ ונחנא המו ונחנאש ימ לכ טלחהבו תיברעמה תוברתב
04:38.19		…רבודמ אל. שפוחב רבודמ אל. הקירמא לש תירבה תוצראב
04:42.21		…. םישנ תויוכז וא םדא תויוכז לש הנגהב רבודמ אל. תוריחב
04:46.26		."העינכ" איה הלימה תועמשמ :רמוא םלסיאש המב רבודמ
04:50.29		… תויחל ןווכתמ אל ינא. ןאכ םכיבגל עדוי אל ינאו
04:54.30		…לכל דבעכ היחא אל ינא.[' ב גוס ,ימלסומ אל חרזא] יממידכ
04:58.34		…בותכש הממ ץוח היגולואידיא לש רחא גוס
05:02.35		.הקירמא לש תירבה תוצרא לש הקוחב
05:06.41
05:10.44
05:14.47
05:18.54		.הדות
05:22.57		…ןיבהל םיבייח ונחנא
05:26.58		.הז ברקב המזוי שדחמ תחקל ונילעש
05:30.63		…םיליבגמ םילהונל תחתמ וישכע םילהנתמ םיריעצה ונילייח ומכ קוידב
05:34.66		.ביואה דגנ המזוי תחקל םהמ םיענומש, ברקל הסינכ לש
05:38.73		…םיענכנ ויה ןבילאט ילייח רשאכ, דנאמלה זוחמ ,ן'גראמ ריעב הנורחאל םתיאר
05:42.74		.בוש םחליהל ורזח םה רורחשה רחאלש ןוויכמ ,ונלש םילייחמ קוחצ םישועו םיררחתשמ, םקשנמ םיקרפתמ
05:46.76		.[ב"הרא אישנ לש דיקפת] אבצה שארב יתייה ינא וליא ילש דוקיפל תחתמ הרוק היה אל הזכ רבד
05:50.80
05:54.83
05:58.88		…םינוכנ םיגטרטסא םילהונ חתפל ונילע ,הרקמ לכב
06:02.92		…הקוחבש וניתויוכזש ןוויכימ. ברקל הסינכ לש
06:06.92		…םימחולה לע לוחל תורומא אל
06:10.96		.הבנ'גה תנמאב ןייוצמש יפכ ביואה לש םייקוח אלה
06:14.99
06:19.00		…הזה ביואל רתוי תושרהל םילוכי אל ונחנא
06:23.05		…םישנאה בורו, ונידגנ ונלש םיקוחב שמתשהלו וניכותל אובל
06:27.07		…תוסנלו ךישמהל םהלש ךרדה תאזש םיעדוי ןאכ םיאצמנה
06:31.12		,םתוא ףודרל ונילע. ונתוא קיתשהל
06:35.14		…: עבשנ ינאו ונלש קוחה תוכרעמב שמתשהל םהל רשפאל אל
06:39.16		… לוזגל תנמ לע ב"הצרא חרזא לש השינעב קלח חקיש ןיד ךרוע לכ
06:43.17		.יתוחא אל איה ,יחא אל אוה, רובידה שפוח ונממ
06:47.20		.תאזה הנידמה תא בוזעלו זוראל םהילע
06:51.26
06:55.30
06:59.33		…ךרד התואב ךישמנ םא
07:03.39		…תיטילופ תוניקתו םזיתוברת-בר לש הביבסב
07:07.43		…לעופב ונחנא, םידיאוריטס לע
07:11.44		.המיאתמו הנוכנ הרוצב ביגהלמ ונימצע תא םיקתשמ
07:15.47		.הירטסואב הרוק המ םיאור ונחנא. ןדוסב הרק המ םיאור ונחנא
07:19.53		.קרמנדב הרוק המ םיעדוי ונחנא. דנלוהב סרדליו טריג לע םיעדוי ונחנא
07:23.57		…הזל ונארק ךכ - המגמה חותינ
07:27.59		םכלוכל הנופ ינא. ךכב ןיקת אל רבד םוש ןיא
07:31.61		…הז לעופב. "פיטואירטס תעיבק" הזל אורקל וקיספת ,הידמב
07:35.65		.ותוא סופתל ךרדו ולש תוגהנתה תוינבת, ביואה לש רותיא
07:39.67		…ואצי חטש יעונפוא לע םירענש יתעדי, קאריעב דקפמכ יתתריש רשאכ
07:43.75		ירחא ףודרל ןכל יתנווכתה אל. ונתוא ףוקתלו םינעטמ חינהל תושרוחמ
07:47.78		.ןהיתבב הלילה עצמאב רודא'צב םישנ
07:51.80		…הנידמל םתוא סינכהל וקיספת, תיטילופ תוניקתב גהנתהל וקיספת. המגמ חותינ הז
07:55.84		.ונלש
07:59.86		…ומינפת אל םא
08:03.94		…םכביוא תואיצמש
08:07.98		…תויחל ךישמנ ונא, םכתואיצמל ךופהל תבייח
08:12.01		ןרס-ברש המו דוה טרופב הפקתמ לע יתארק רשאכ. השחכהב
08:16.07		תינכת יתיאר רשאכ. םומה יתייה, השע ןסח
08:20.10		רמא יסייק ףולאו ,ןושאר םויב
08:24.11		…ןדבואמ רשאמ ןוויג לש ןדבאה תורשפאמ רתוי דרטומ אוהש
08:28.16		…היעב ונל שי ,דוה טרופ סיסבב םילייח רשע השולש לש
08:32.19		.תירבה תוצרא יגיהנמ ברקב
08:36.25
08:40.28		.םהלש תואיצמה תא לבקל ונילע
08:44.30		םיבייח ונחנא .הטושפ ךכ לכ איה המידק ךרדו
08:48.36		.וז הנידמב הנוכנ תוגיהנמ רוחבל
08:52.38		.הפוריא תונידמב הנוכנ תוגיהנמב רוחבל םיבייח ונחנא
08:56.39		.דחפת אלש תוגיהנמב רוחבל ונילע
09:00.46		.םירצונו םידוהי ףוקתל וקיספת :הידמה ירבח
09:04.46		וארת. הזה ביואהמ דחפל וקיספת
09:08.52		…. םג ,םיאקירמא םכיתימע דגנ םיניגפמ םתאש תאזל ההז תובהלתה
09:12.55		,וישכעמ הנש םיעברא, םישולש :והשמ םכל דיגהל יל ושרתש ינפמ. וניבייוא יפלכ
09:16.56		…וזה הנידמב ןוטלשל ועיגיו וחילצי םהו הרקמב
09:20.60		שפוח היהי אל. רובידה שפוח היהי אל. תישפוח הידמ רתוי ראשית אל
09:24.63		עשפל םיפתוש ויהת? המ ושחנתו. יוטיבה
09:28.70		.הדמע תחקל ידכ ידמ םינדחפ םתא יכ
09:32.73
09:36.76
09:40.82		,וישכע
09:44.84		,תירבה תוצראב תונורקע םע םיגיהנמל ןמז הז וישכע
09:48.85		…החקל טבזילאש טוטיצב ומכש ללגב
09:52.88		תידדצ-דח ךרדל תכפוה תונלבוס רשאכ ,ינממ
09:56.91		.תוברתה תודבאתהל הליבומ איה
10:00.95		…ילש ך"נתה רפס םע הידועסל סוטל לכואש םויב
10:04.97		הכמב היסנכל תכלל, יראווצ לע יולג בלצו ,דיב
10:08.98		.בוט בצמב היהנ ונחנא זא
10:13.03		,זא דע ךא
10:17.05		ןיבהל םיבייח ונחנא
10:21.11		עבק םלסיאש תורטמו םידעי
10:25.14		ונימצעב םיאג תויהל ונילע. דיתעל
10:29.15		תיקרוטה תסנכב דומעיש גיהנמ ונל היהיש רוסא
10:33.22		תידוהי-תירצונ המוא אל איה הקירמאש זירכיו
10:37.24		…םאניש גיהנמ ונל היהיש רוסא
10:41.26		…לש תירבה תוצרא םשב לצנתיו םירצמב ריהק תטיסרבינואב
10:45.30		תיאקירמא הוואגב רבודמ אל. הקירמא
10:49.31		…הלאשלש גיהנמ ונל היהיש רוסא
10:53.36		.הבושת אצומ אל "? ןוחצנ רידגמ התא ךיא"
10:57.39		ןוחצנ רידגמ ינא :םכל רמול יל ושרת
11:01.40		םזינומוק לע לאשנ אוה רשאכ ןגייר דלנורש ומכ ךרד התואב
11:05.44		םכתוא ךרבי םיהולאש. "םידספמ םה ,םיחצנמ ונחנא"
11:09.47		.הדות
11:13.53
11:17.57

German translation by JLH and ESW

00:00.02		Danke
00:04.07		Danke sehr.
00:08.11		und Pamela, danke für die Vorstellung und Robert es ist grossartig,
00:12.12		heute mit Ihnen allen hier zu sein, und ich will Ihnen nur eines sagen: wenn
00:16.17		die Wahrheit einfach Volksverhetzung ist, so soll man mich einsperren,
00:20.20		denn ich schweige nicht.
00:24.27
00:28.32		Eine der zentralen konservativen Prinzipien ist die nationale Sicherheit.
00:32.34		Dass wir hier sind und dies besprechen, das ist
00:36.38		etwas, das das amerikanische Volk von konservativer, prinzipientreuer
00:40.41		Führung erwartet: nämlich, es zu beschützen. Und wenn wir hier nicht aufstehen,
00:44.46		in dieser grossen Versammlung, die wir hier veranstalten, und erklären, wer wir sind
00:48.49		und dass wir diese Situation, diese Umstände verstehen, dann wird sich das amerikanische Volk
00:52.51		von uns abwenden. Diese konservativen Führer, die Sie dieses Wochende hier sehen,
00:56.57		müssen Sie dafür in die Pflicht nehmen, alles zu tun, Sie zu schützen.
01:00.59		Erlauben Sie mir, einiges zu erklären. Ich sass da hinten und hörte zu.
01:04.60		Ich hab’ die Nase voll davon, dass man sagt: Krieg gegen den Terror. Es gibt keinen Krieg
01:08.64		gegen denTerror. Wie klug wäre es im Zweiten Weltkrieg gewesen, wenn die USA gesagt hätten, sie stünden auf Kriegszustand mit dem Blitzkrieg
01:16.69		oder mit der Kamikaze. Eine Nation zieht nicht
01:20.72		gegen eine Taktik in den Krieg. So wie,
01:24.74		wenn man dasitzt und unsere strategischen Führer sieht,
01:28.79		die sonntags in diesen Pressefragestunden im Fernsehen sitzen, und sie reden darüber,
01:32.84		wie toll es ist, dass wir diese “Drohnenangriffe” lenken,
01:36.85		so denkt man daran zurück. was in Vietnam passierte,
01:40.89		als LBJ [Präsident Lyndon B. Johnson] die Bombardierung direkt aus dem
01:44.92		Weissen Haus genehmigte. Das soll kein strategischer Denker
01:48.93		machen. Das ist doch nicht die strategische Perspektive.
01:52.97		Eine Nation geht gegen eine Ideologie in den Krieg,
01:56.98		und eben das besprechen wir heute hier.
02:01.02		Wir sprechen darüber, dass wir mit etwas zu tun haben, was eine totalitäre,
02:05.05		theokratische, politische Ideologie ist, und sie
02:09.06		heisst “Islam.”
02:13.09
02:17.12
02:21.16		Es geht nicht um Muslime.
02:25.18		Es ist genau so wie es in Nazi Deutschland war: nicht jeder
02:29.20		Deutsche war ein Nazi. Genau so wie es war, als ich
02:33.24		2003 in Iraq war: nicht jeder Iraqi war Mitglied der
02:37.26		Baath Partei. Wovon ich hier spreche,
02:41.30		ist eine Ideologie, die seit 622 n.Chr. besteht,
02:45.33		seit dem siebenten Jahrhundert. Sie begann mit dem
02:49.34		Überfall auf Nakhla, nachdem Mohammed seine Hedschra aus Mecca nach
02:53.38		Medina machte. Seitdem ist sie gewaltätig, stellt sich dem Westen entgegen,
02:57.41		und dies ist nur ein weiteres Kapitel in einem langen Buch,
03:01.42		das sie schreiben, um jeden einzelnen von uns zu unterwerfen.
03:05.46		Und jetzt ist es an der Zeit, genauso wie unsere Ahnen aufstehen mussten, um diese Feinde zurücktreiben,
03:09.47		müssen wir jetzt aufstehen und diese Feinde zurücktreiben, und heute noch.
03:13.51
03:17.55
03:21.56		Sie hörten [zurückgetretener US Geheimdienstoffizier] Stephen [Coughlin] über “Abrogation” sprechen. Sie müssen Sachen wie ded Vertrag
03:25.66		von Hudaibayah verstehen, wo sie dasitzen werden und täuschen,
03:29.68		indem sie abwarten, damit sie stark werden. In dieser Weise, im den Jahren 627,
03:33.72		628, konnte Muhammed nach Hudaibiyah eindringen
03:37.75		und Mekka erobern. Ebendies spielt sich gerade heute ab.
03:41.75		Sie müssen die Traditionen Muhammeds verstehen. (z.B.) Als er Briefe
03:45.80		an Chosroes, den persischen Kaiser schrieb, als er Briefe an Heraclius
03:49.82		den byzantinischen Kaiser schrieb, die besagten: “Sie haben drei Möglichkeiten: Sie konvertieren,
03:53.88		Sie unterwerfen sich, oder wir erobern Sie. Nun, was glauben Sie?
03:57.92		Damals, ungefähr 1992 tat Osama bin Laden eben dasselbe.
04:01.94		Er schickte einen Brief an die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Später, ungefähr
04:05.98		2005, 2006 tat Mahmoud Ahmadinejad genau dasselbe.
04:10.01		Er schickte einen Brief an das amerikanische Volk und Präsidenten Bush. Wir befinden uns schon
04:14.02		in einem erklärten Krieg und, haben wir nicht die Art von Führung, die das verstehen kann,
04:18.05		die diesen Feind, diesen Gegner studieren kann,
04:22.07		so sind wir in diesem grossen Land auf der Strasse ins Verderben.
04:26.12		Das müssen wir verstehen. Jeder, der [heute] hier stand und Ihnen erklärte,
04:30.14		daß Scharia nicht zu uns passt, zu dem, wer wir sind
04:34.16		in der westlichen Zivilisation, ganz bestimmt, wer wir sind und was wir
04:38.19		in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika vertreten. Es geht nicht um Freiheit, nicht einfach darum
04:42.21		frei zu sein, es geht nicht darum, Menschenrechte und Frauenrechte zu schützen.
04:46.26		Es geht darum, was Islam meint: das Wort bedeutet “Unterwerfung.”
04:50.29		Ich weiss nicht, wie Sie alle denken; ich aber lebe nicht
04:54.30		als Dhimmi. Ich lebe unter keiner
04:58.34		anderen Ideologie, als jener, die beschrieben wurde:
05:02.35		der Verfassung dieser grossartigen Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika.
05:06.41
05:10.44
05:14.47
05:18.54		Danke.
05:22.57		Wir müssen es begreifen,
05:26.58		wir haben die Initiative in diesem Kampf wieder zurückgewinnen.
05:30.63		Wir sehen, wie unsere jungen Soldaten jetzt unter diesen restriktiven
05:34.66		Verhaltensregeln funktionieren, die ihnen verbietet, die Initiative gegen den Feind zu nehmen.
05:38.73		Sie haben gerade gesehen, wie in Marjan in der Helmand Provinz die Taliban herauskommen und
05:42.74		die Waffen fallenlassen, unsere Soldaten verspotten und und weggehen, um wieder zu kämpfen.
05:46.76		Das würde nicht unter meiner Führung geschehen, wäre ich Oberbefehlshaber.
05:50.80
05:54.83
05:58.88		Daraus folgt: wir müssen die richtige Art und Weise
06:02.92		der Verhaltensregeln auf strategischem Niveau entwickeln. Denn unsere
06:06.92		Grundrechte sollten keinen illegalen
06:10.96		feindlichen Kombattanten gegeben werden, wie in der Genfer Konvention vorgesehen.
06:14.99
06:19.00		Wir können es nicht mehr zulassen, dass dieser Feind
06:23.05		diese neue Taktik nmens “lawfare” benutzt. Die meisten von Ihnen hier
06:27.07		wissen: so versuchen sie fortwährend, einen
06:31.12		mundtot zu machen. Wir sollten sie verfolgen,
06:35.14		nicht erlauben, dass sie unser Justizsystem benutzen. Verdammt noch mal!
06:39.16		Der Anwalt, der einen Bürger der Vereinigten Staaten anklagt, um
06:43.17		seine Redefreiheit zu nehmen--er ist nicht mein Bruder, sie ist nicht meine Schwester.
06:47.20		Er/sie muss die Siebensachen einpacken und dieses Land verlassen.
06:51.26
06:55.30
06:59.33		Fahren wir
07:03.39		in dieser politisch korrekten multikulti Atmosphäre fort,
07:07.43		die auf Steroiden ist,
07:11.44		so lähmen wir uns, sodass wir nicht richtig und in geeigneter Weise handeln.
07:15.47		Wir sehen, was im Sudan passiert ist, wir sehen was in Österreich passiert.
07:19.53		Wir wissen Bescheid über Geert Wilders in den Niederlanden. Wir wissen, was sich in Dänemark abspielt.
07:23.57		Trendanalyse haben wir das genannt…
07:27.59		Daran ist nichts auszusetzen. Und Sie hier
07:31.61		in den Medien—Hören Sie auf, das “profiling” zu nennen. Es geht darum,
07:35.65		die Feinde zu identifizieren. Und was man da macht, ist, sie verfolgen.
07:39.67		Als ich Befehlshaber in Iraq war, wusste ich, dass junge Männer auf Geländemotorädern aus den Gebüsch kamen,
07:43.75		um IEDs [Sprengfallen]zu legen und uns anzugreifen. Ich hatte nicht vor,
07:47.78		Frauen in Burkas mitten in der Nacht in ihren Häusern zu verfolgen.
07:51.80		Es ist Trendanalyse. Schluss mit dem politisch Korrektsein. Aufhören, sie
07:55.84		in unser Land kommen zu lassen.
07:59.86		Wenn Sie nicht verstehen,
08:03.94		dass die Wirklichkeit Ihres Feindes
08:07.98		Ihre eigene werden muss, können wir in diesem
08:12.01		Verweigerungszustand fortfahren. Als ich von dem Fort Hood Attentat, las,
08:16.07		von dem, was Major Hasan tat, war ich entsetzt. Als ich dastand und
08:20.10		die Sonntagspressestunde sah, als General Casey, der Heeresstabchef, sagte,
08:24.11		er mache sich mehr Gedanken darüber, dass Diversität ein Opfer werde
08:28.16		als über die dreizehn Soldaten in Fort Hood, (da wusste ich:) Wir haben Probleme
08:32.19		in der Führung dieser Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika.
08:36.25
08:40.28		Wir müssen ihre Wirklichkeit annehmen.
08:44.30		Der Weg nach vorwärts ist so einfach. Man muss
08:48.36		in diesem Land die richtige Art von Führung bekpmmen. Denn darum geht es.
08:52.38		Man muss die richtige Art von Führung überall in Europa bekommen.
08:56.39		Man muss die richtige Art von Führung bekommen, die nicht ängstlich ist.
09:00.46		An die Mitglieder der Medien: Aufhören, Juden und Christen zu attackieren.
09:48.55
09:04.46		Haben Sie keine Angst nicht mehr vor diesem Feind! Zeigen Sie dieselbe
09:08.52		Leidenschaft, die Sie gegen ihre amerikanischen Landsleute zeigen wollen,
09:12.55		gegen ihn. Denn lassen Sie mich Ihnen etwas sagen: dreissig oder vierzig Jahre in der Zukunft
09:16.56		wenn es denen gelungen ist, und sie dieses Land beherrschen,
09:20.60		dann wird es keine freien Medien geben. Es wird keine Redefreiheit geben, es wird
09:24.63		keine Meinungsfreiheit geben. Und raten Sie was? Sie werden daran mitschuldig gewesen sein,
09:28.70		weil Sie zu feige waren, Stellung zu nehmen.
09:32.73
09:36.76
09:40.82		Jetzt,
09:44.84		jetzt ist die Zeit für prinzipientreue Führung in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika.
09:48.85		Denn, wie im Zitat, das Elisabeth (Sabaditsch-Wolff, Mitglied des Akademikerbundes)
09:52.88		von mir hat: wenn Toleranz eine Einbahnstrasse wird,
09:56.91		führt das zum kulturellen Selbstmord.
10:00.95		Wenn ich nach Saudi Arabien fliegen kann--
10:04.97		Bibel in der Hand, Kreuz um den Nacken--nach Mecca gehen kann,
10:08.98		in eine Kirche gehen kann, dann, wissen Sie was? Dann sind wir startklar.
10:13.03		Bis dahin aber
10:17.05		müssen wir verstehen:
10:21.11		die Ziele und Zwecke, die Islam erklärt
10:25.14		hat. Wir müssen stolz darauf sein, wer wir sind
10:29.15		Wir können keine Führung haben, die vor der türkischen
10:33.22		Generalversammlung steht, und sagt, Amerika is keine jüdisch-christlich Nation.
10:37.24		Wir können keine Führung haben, die vor
10:41.26		einer Universität in Kairo, A¨gyten steht und sich für die Vereinigten Staaten
10:45.30		von Amerika entschuldigt. Darum geht es beim amerikanischen Stolz nicht.
10:49.31		Wir können keine Führung haben, die
10:53.46		man fragt: Wie definiert man Sieg, und sie kann nicht antworten.
10:57.39		Nun, lassen Sie mich erklären, so definiere ich Sieg…
11:01.40		gerade so wie Ronald Reagan das getan hat, als man ihn das in Bezug auf den Kommunismus fragte:
11:05.44		“Wir gewinnen, sie verlieren.”
11:09.47		Danke.
11:13.53
11:17.57